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ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and
PENNY LOCHHEAD,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Plaintiffs/Appellant#
vs.

Case No. 890536

STEPHEN C. JORDAN,
Defendant/Respondent.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction in this matter is vested in this court
by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3).

This is an appeal from an

Order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah, denying the
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate an Order of Dismissal.
STATFMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Trial Court erred in rewriting the parties'
contract and refusing to vacate the dismissal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs/Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Lochhead,
sold property to the Defendant, Jordan.
was secured by a Trust Deed.

The obligation

When the secured property

was sold, Jordan managed to have the property released
without paying Lochheads, R 2 f 21 file C87-35961.
balance owed was in excess of $20,000.00.

The

R 154, page 4,

7.
Following compliance with the provisions of the
Utah Trust Deed Statute, a Trustees sale was held on March
31, 1987. The Trustee's Deed issued on May 27 of the same
year.

On May 28, Case No. C87-3596 was filed seeking a

deficiency under the Trust Deed Statute.

At some point

thereafter personnel in both the Plaintiffs' and the
Defendant's counsel's offices became confused on the civil
numbers and pleadings relating to the 1987 case were filed
with the 1985 number.

The two cases were consolidated by

an Order of the court dated November 21, 1989. R 36 file
87-3596.
Lochheads asked for a deficiency of $20,524.00
plus attorney's fees and interest at the contractual rate
of 12.5 percent from June 15, 1984, R2 file C87-3596. The
accrued interest on the principal as of November 1989, the
month of the hearing, was $13,896.46 for a total balance
of principal and interest of $34,420.46.

All citations to the record are to file number C85-8354
unless otherwise specified.
-2-

While the litigation was pending Jordan filed a
Chapter 13 in Phoenix, Arizona.

R 134f 45.

Lochheads

were advised by Jordan1s bankruptcy counsel that the
allocation of assets based upon the debts listed would pay
them less than $7,400.00, R 154, pg. 4, R 120, 92, and
$7,000.00 was offered to resolve the matter.
After negotiations Lochheads agreed to take
$8,000.00, R 123.

Jordan moved the bankruptcy court to

authorize the settlement but the motion was denied, R 147,
133.

Thereafter Jordan dismissed the bankruptcy and

demanded that Lochheads settle on the previous terms, R
137.

Lochheads responded that the $8,000.00 settlement

offer had been made with the understanding that they would
receive the money in relatively short order which had not
occurred, R 105.

If they were to settle they would need

interest at Utah's statutory rate on the settlement
amount, R 138.

Jordan declined and moved to reopen the

bankruptcy in order to enforce the supposed settlement, R
113.

That Motion was also denied.

In that order

Lochheads learned that Jordan had misrepresented his
available assets to them, R 147. Further negotiations
ensued and Lochheads advised Jordan that they would settle
for $8,000.00 if the sum could be received within ten
-3-

days, R 139, 118.

Lochhead's counsel prepared a

stipulation and order of dismissal which were given to and
signed by Jordan's Salt Lake counsel on Jordan's behalf, R
120f 51, 50. The Third District Court matter had been
dismissed based upon a Stipulation between the parties as
part of the settlement R 154 p. 4-6.

More than a month

later Lochheads advised Jordan that the money had not been
paid and that they were proceeding to reopen the matter in
the Third District Court, R 140.
Lochheads moved Third District Court to vacate the
Order of Dismissal based upon Jordan's failure to comply
with the terms of the settlement agreement, R 53. Judge
Brian heard oral argument on the matter and ruled
essentially that the only thing involved was the
additional interest claimed by the Lochheads and that they
should be paid that sum in addition to the $8,000.00
forthwith.

If they were so paid the matter would remain

dismissed, R 127, R 154 pg. 14. The Lochheads appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This matter should be reviewed de novo.
An executory accord does not produce a satisfaction
of the underlying agreement unless the terms of the
accords are met.
-4-

When parties enter into a contract with specific
terms the Court may not rewrite that agreement on terms it
deems to be just.
A party to a contract is entitled to rely upon
factual statements made by the other party.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE
AND REVIEW DE NOVO.
Lochheads Motion to Vacate the Order
of Dismissal was heard pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the
Code of Judicial Administration.

At the hearing the court

reviewed affidavits describing the history of negotiations
between the parties.

No testimony was taken.

In other

words all the evidence relied upon by the trial court is
in the record before this court.. All argument was on the
record.
This case is in the same posture before the
Appellate Court as was Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals/
Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah App. 1988).

There the court

said,
"Because the trial court made its
determination based solely upon Bench's
deposition, proffers and the pleadings, it
had no opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses. Thus, this Court
on appellate review, has as good an
-5-

opportunity as the trial court to examine
the evidence and may review the facts de
novo."
This is an appropriate standard of review because
there were no findings of fact made by the trial court and
this court gives no deference to legal conclusions but
only reviews them for correctness/ Cove View Excavating &
Const, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988).
II.
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A CONTRACT
JORDAN BREACHED.
The history in the affidavits before the trial court
shows a lengthy set of negotiations culminated by a letter
from Lochheads counsel offering to settle the matter on
specific terms, R. 118, 129.

These negotiations and the

offer to settle should be analyzed in accordance with the
rules applied to general contract actions. Butcher v.
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah App. 1987).
The language of this offer was specific,
"The Lochheads had [sic] reconsidered and
are willing to except [sic] the amount of
$8,000.00 for settlement of the above matter
if that amount it [sic] received within the
next ten (10) days."
The letter, typographical errors notwithstanding,
expressed an offer to settle for a specified amount within
a specified time.

The offer was accepted, as admitted by
-6-

Mr. Jordan's Arizona counsel, R 120/ by requesting a
dismissal of the action pending in Salt Lake.

No request

was made for an extension of time beyond the 10 days in
the Lochheads1 August 1 letter.

The signed stipulation

and the order of dismissal were delivered to Jordan's Utah
counsel was signed by him on August 7.

Jordan's Utah counsel's

name and telephone number appear on Arizona counsel's copy
of the August 1 letter.
The terms of the settlement contract were:
1.

Payment of $8,000.00 ;

2.

Within ten days; and

3.

Dismissal of the action.

Terms one and three were met.

Term two was not.

The court below felt it appropriate to engraft his
own standard of reason onto this contract some three
months after it had been reached and breached.

The

transcript of the hearing displays his thinking and
attitude, R 154, Pgs. 8, 11-23.
This court has previously held that judicial
modification of a stated performance time in a contract is
plain error.

In Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah

1986) Justice Durham said, writing for the court:
"When a contract specifically states the
time for its performance, it is plain error
to allow it to be performed within a
-7-

reasonable time. A court may allow a
contract to be performed within a reasonable
time only when the contract is silent as to
the time for its performance. In Bradford
v. Alvey & Sons, 621, P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah
1980), we stated: "[Wlhen a provision in a
contract requires an act to be performed
without specifying the time, the law implies
that it is to be done within a reasonable
time under the circumstances.1 The contract
at issue here is explicit in its time for
performance and leaves no room for other
interpretations."
The language here is as clear as it was in Watson,
n

. . . if that amount [is! received within the next ten

(10) days."

Despite having been cited to rule of law in

Watson, R 154 page 13, the trial court chose to reform the
contract.
III.
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS AN EXECUTORY
ACCORD.
Lochheads underlying claims against Jordan exceed
$30,000.00.

The negotiations between the parties were

intended to compromise all claims in exchange for payment
as an accord and satisfaction.

The mere creation of an

executory accord does not result in satisfaction or
discharge of the underlying claim.
The situation here is strikingly similar to that in
L & A Drywall, Inc. v Whitmore Const. Co., Inc., 608 P.2d
626, 629 (Utah 1980) where Justice Hall held,
-8-

"It is true thatf where an alleged breach of
an agreement or compromise and settlement
occurs, the aggrieved party need not file a
separate action to seek judicial relief, but
may proceed by a simple motion made as a part
of the original action on the underlying
dispute. It is likewise true that an
agreement of compromise and settlement in a
legal dispute constitutes an executory
accord. As such, a party to the agreement
aggrieved by an alleged breach thereof by the
other party has the option of seeking to
enforce the settlement agreement, or
regarding the agreement as rescinded and
moving against the other party on the
underlying claim."
Lochheads clearly opted to rescind the breached executory
accord and proceed on their original claims for breach of
the Real Estate Contract.
Despite having this argument presented to him, R154
page 17, the trial court maintained that all that was at
issue was the interest on the amount subject to the
executory accord.
IV.
JORDAN1S MISREPRESENTATION IS SUFFICIENT,
BY ITSELF, TO VACATE THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.
Very early in the negotiations Jordan's Arizona
counsel represented that Jordan's assets would only support
a recovery, in the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy of $7,400.00, R
92-93.

A year and a half later the Arizona Bankruptcy

Court denied Jordan's motion to reinstate his Bankruptcy
-9-

because of the existence of "substantial additional assets"
R 146-147.
When the issue of misrepresentation was raised with
the trial court, R 154 pg. 18, he responded that Lochheads
had a duty to investigate Jordan's counsel's
representation, R 154 pg. 18.
The trial court's position on this point is directly
in conflict with Utah Law.

In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d

1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) this court held that one party had
no duty to investigate the facts surrounding a
representation by another party as to the extent of his
assets, see also Christenson v. Com. Land Title
Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983).

In this case the

representations were the sworn statements of the debtor,
Jordan, in his bankruptcy schedules.
Even if the settlement agreement were not an
executory accord Jordan's misrepresentation is sufficient
to rescind the agreement and vacate the dismissal.
V.
RULE 60 REQUIRES THAT THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL BE VACATED.
The trial court's order denying Lochheads Motion to
Vacate the Order of Dismissal is a final appealable order,
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep.
17 (Utah App. 89).
-10-

Rule 60(b) contains seven sub parts.

Jordan's

actions require the court to consider subparts 3 and 7.
Part 3 authorizes the vacation of the order for
fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of the adverse
party.

Jordan's representation as to his assets subject to

the Chapter 13 require vacation of the order since the
settlement agreement upon which the order was based was
based on that misrepresentation.

Additionally, Jordan's

failure to follow through with the terms of the settlement
agreement is a breach of that agreement constituting
misconduct by a party.
In the event the court determines that Jordan's
actions do not meet the criteria of Rule 60(b)(3), Rule
60(b)(7) requires that the order be vacated.

The case was

dismissed in reliance upon Jordan's performance which did
not occur.
In Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513f 515 (Utah 1979)
this court suggested that on a Rule 60(b) motion the
appropriate inquiry is why a party failed to respond.

In

this case the reason is that the opposing party breached a
contract.

The consideration for that contract was the

dismissal of this case.

Having breached he is not entitled

to retain his consideration/ dismissal of the suit.
-11-

In Haner v. Haner/ 373 P.2d 577/ 578 (Utah 1962) this
court described the rule for considering Rule 60(b)
motions:
"It seems more realistic to say that when it
appears that the processes of justice have
been so completely thwarted or distorted as
to persuade the court that in fairness and
good conscience the judgment should not be
permitted to stand/ relief should be
granted."
By the Haner standard the dismissal below should be
vacated.
CONCLUSION
The preamble to Rule 60(b) refers to its purpose
". . . in the furtherance of justice . . . . n

The record

shows that Jordan evaded Lochheads security interest and
breached his contract with them.

He failed to respond or

appear when the trust deed was foreclosed.

Once he was

served he evaded the issues. When the matter was pressed
he filed bankruptcy.

From within bankruptcy he attempted

to negotiate a settlement which the court would not let him
keep.
Literally years after Jordan commenced his
shenanigans the Lochheads said/ one last time/ we will
settle this matter if you settle it now.

Jordan failed to

meet the terms of this agreement/ as he had with past
-12-

agreements, and the Lochheads said enough is enough.

They

are entitled to pursue their initial claim and this court
should direct the trial court to allow them to do so.
DATED this / L> day of February, 1990.

Attorney for Appellants
ATTACHMENTS
Minute Entry of November 16, 1989
Order of November 22, 1989
Transcript of Hearing

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be deposited in
the United States Mailf postage prepaid, to:
Frederick N. Green
GREEN & BERRY
Attorneys for Respondent
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on this

/ (f

day of February, 1990.

ROBERT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
LOCHHEAD, PAUL R
PLAINTIFF
V5
JORDAN, STEPHEN C

CASE NUMBER 850908354 CV
DATE 11/16/89
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK EHM

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. ROBERT H. WILDE
D. ATTY. FREDERICK N. GREEN

THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS
MOTION TO VACATE. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. MOTION IS ARGUED
AND SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
MOTION TO VACATE IS DENIED. COURT ORDERS COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT TO OBTAIN $8,000.00 ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 20,
1989 @5:00 P.M. COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT WILL HAND CARRY
THE CHECK TO COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
INTEREST WII.L BE CALCULATED AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM AUGUST
10, 1989 THHU OCTOBER 20, 1989. CHECK FOR THE INTEREST
SHOULD BE HAND DELIVERED BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT TO
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF BY NOVEMBER 20, 1989 @ 5:00 P.M.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT WILL PREPARE THE ORDER BY 11-22-89.

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0)
Attorneys for Defendant
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

-w t '
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NOV 2 2 1939

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and
PENNY LOCHHEAD,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No, C85-8354

vs.
STEPHEN C. JORDAN,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian, on the 16th day
of November, 1989, the parties being represented by their counsel
of record, and the matter having been argued and submitted to the
Court for decision, and good cause otherwise appearing it is,
hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs1 Motion to Vacate Order is, and is

hereby, denied.
2.

That Defendant shall, through his counsel of record,

cause to be hand delivered to Plaintiffs1 counsel, the following:

(a)

A check in the amount of $8000 payable to the

Plaintiffs; and
(b)

A check representing legal interest from August 10

until November 20, 1989 in the amount of $268.26.
3.

That both checks referred to above shall be certified

and shall be delivered no later than 5:00 p.m. November 20, 1989.
4.

That Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare this

Order and submit it to the Court no later than 12:00 noon,
November 22,-1989.
DATED THIS

m

a£.

day of

^

•?- > /

1989
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

/I tfjDVGiStcf

&} ^

^

l/Ml

/!/L

^\ n r* * * f~\

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)

C0UNT

)

:ss

W»T

Audrea E>?—Bueno, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Defendant herein, that she served the attached
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Robert H. Wilde, Esq
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Cook & Wilde
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
therein, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
S7J)

^^

day of November, 1989.

4 ^ ^ - d>
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

10

d a y of

November, 1989.
My Commission Expires:
rPubfio
1
JUUEfiURTON
53 NatounBfe 10 Exchange 1
3ait Lake City, Utah »41i1 \
My Commission
February 9,1
State of Utah

^JS^vCT
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* •

PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and
PENNY LOCHHEAD,
Plaintiffs,
-ve-

Case No. C85-8354
Honorable Pat B. Brian

STEPHEN C. JORDAN,

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.
* • *

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
November 16, 1989
* * *

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiffs:

Robert H. Wilde
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047

For the Defendant:

Frederick N. Green
528 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 I

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

2 J
3

Stephen Jordan, C85-8354.

4
5

MR. WILDE:

Robert Wilde for the plaintiffs, your

MR. GREEN:

Frederick N. Green appearing for the

defendant.

8
9

Counsel will state an appearance.

Honor.

6
7

Paul R. Lochhead and Penny Lochhead vs.

THE COURT:

To begin the hearing, the Court is going

to read a letter dated October 2, authored by Mr. Green, to

10

the judge of this court.

11

motion to vacate an order, based upon a stipulation of the

12

parties.

13

rule 4-501, nor apparently contain a memorandum in support

14

thereof, the defendants objected.

15

to the motion.

16

objection and filed a notice to submit and proposed order.

17

The defendant objects to this and the objection is enclosed.

18

As you can see, this Is all very confusing.

19

the entire matter be scheduled for oral argument so we can

20

sort this out and see where everybody stands prior to any more

21

memoranda being filed.

22
23
24 I
25

"The plaintiffs have brought a

Because the motion did not cite its compliance to

The objection was in reply

The plaintiffs have since replied to the

I would suggest

Sincerely, Frederick N. Green."

The Court has two questions.

Was a motion to vacate

agreed upon by the parties?
MR. GREEN:

There has been no stipulation to vacate

the order, your Honor.

1
2
3

MR. WILDE: No, there has been no agreement to
vacate.
THE COURT:

The plaintiffs have brought a motion to

4

vacate an order based on a stipulation of the parties. What

5

was the stipulation?

6

MR. GREEN:

That's confusing.

The stipulation was

7

to settle the case. Based upon that stipulation an order of

8

dismissal was entered.

9

vacate the order of dismissal. There Is no stipulation to

10
11 I
12
13
14
15 I

They have now brought a motion to

vacate that order.
MR. WILDE:

I don't believe that the letter

correctly states the status of the case.
THE COURT: Somebody ought to explain to the Court
what18 going on.
MR. WILDE: Perhaps I could do that.

The Court, on

16

the phone yesterday, Indicated that It would be willing to

17

consider whatever additional Information we wished to provide.

18 I If I may approach the bench.
19

THE COURT: You may.

20

MR. WILDE: I prepared an affidavit, which covers

21

correspondence between myself and my counterpart in Arizona,

22

and also the attorney who was employed by my client In Arizona

23

In the bankruptcy.

24

Court a copy of the order of September 1, 1989, In the

26

bankruptcy in Arizona, denying the motion to reopen the

Also, we have included —

provided the

1

bankruptcy, and a copy of the case of Watson vs. Hatch.

2

Essentially, what happened in this case, my clients

3

have a claim against the defendant, dating back to I believe

4

about 1985, 1986, in the amount of $23,000, for a deficiency

5

on a trust deed note.

6

property that that note secured released, without paying it,

7

and declined to pay thereafter, and we filed suit.

8

ensued.

9

The defendant managed to get the

Litigation

Mr. Jordan moved to Arizona and filed a chapter 13.
The Court will look at the first exhibit of the

10

affidavit, that's a letter from Mr. Newdelmon, who is

11

Mr. Jordan's attorney in Arizona, and there he states that the

12

$8,000 offer he is making is more than my clients are going to

13

be able to get out of the chapter 13 bankruptcy.

14

upon those representations, settlement negotiations got

15

underway.

16

And based

This offer, as the Court can see, was made in April

17

of 1988.

18

understanding, is in the summer of 1988 there was an

19

acceptance by my client of the offer to settle for $8,000,

20

understanding on my client's part the sum would be paid in

21

fairly short order.

22

Negotiations continued, and sometime, my

Exhibit 2 is a letter that I wrote back to

23

Mr. Hendricksen, and discussed the fact that we talked about

24

getting this $8,000, and we thought we were going to get it

25

fairly quickly.

Notice, this letter is in February of 1989.

1

We are looking eight or nine months later.

We agree that we

2

had agreed at that particular time to do that.

3

Exhibit 3, however, Is a letter from Mr. Hendrlcksen

4

back to me, saying that the proposal had been submitted to the

5

bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court, who had

6

Mr. Jordan*s bankruptcy before It, his chapter 13, had

7

declined to allow that settlement to be made.

8

fairly clear that at that point In time there was no more

9

settlement, because the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over

It seems to us

10

Mr. Jordan and they declined to allow him to settle In that

11

fashion.

12

Look over to Exhibit 4, that's a letter from

13 I Mr. Newdelmon, the defendant's Arizona counsel, back to me.
14

They still want to go through with the matter, and they want

15

us to settle it for the $8,000.

16

Exhibit 5, we said no, we don't think that is fair.

17

We want Interest.

We understood we were going to be able to

18

settle, get the money fairly quickly.

19

we are going to settle for $800, which is statutory 10-percent

20

interest on the $8,000.

That has happened, so

21

Exhibit 6 is a letter back to me.

22

Exhibit 7, these two letters essentially show that

23

we continued to dicker, to continue to negotiate the matter.

24
25

Exhibit 8 is my letter to Mr. Newdelmon of August 1.
I think this is probably the important letter.

There I say to

1 I Mr. Newdelman, "The Lochheads have reconsidered and are
2

willing to accept the amount of $8,000 for settlement of the

3

above matter if that amount is received within the next ten

4

days."

5

full 20 percent of the entire contents of the letter. We

6

said, yes, we will settle for $8,000 if we can get it within

7

the next ten days.

That language is specific.

8
9

It constitutes probably

We then prepared the stipulation and order of
dismissal, submitted them to Mr. Green before August 10, and

10

Mr. Green endorsed them.

They were then submitted to the

11

Court.

12

September 6, almost a month later, saying, We told you on

13

August 1 we are willing to settle If we can get the money

14

within ten days.

15

is withdrawn.

Exhibit 9 is our letter back to Mr. Newdelman

16

The money hasn't come. Obviously, the offer

Exhibit 10 is his letter back to me, where he

17

acknowledges that, yes, there was a deal for $8,000.

18

don't have it. He says the cashier's check was available and

19

whatever.

20

whatsoever that he needed to have the signed dismissal In his

21

office in Arizona.

22

because Mr. Jordan has counsel here In Utah, Mr. Green, who

23

signed the stipulation, and the dismissal needs to be filed

24

here.

25

There Is no correspondence.

No, you

I had no information

I am not certain what good that would do,

That's exactly what happened, and that's how the

case got dismissed, and we are back here today, and we filed
our motion to vacate on the grounds that we dismissed this
action based upon the assumption that they were going to
comply with the offer we had made to them.
will be paid $8,000 within ten days.

The offer was we

That did not happen.

I

note that they were not out anxiously knocking at our door.
I would comment to the Court that a fair amount of
the correspondence between Mr. Newdelman and myself has been
telefaxed to my office by Mr. Newdelman.

Notably, the

assertion that we have to have the dismissal sent to my
office, all of those things, no correspondence whatsoever.
All we have Is an affidavit from Mr. Newdelman18 secretary,
saying she spoke with my secretary.

He have a counter-

affidavit from my secretary, saying the affidavit she states,
It Is not how things were.
THE COURT:

The question the Court has to ask —

excuse the Court If the question Is impertinent.

and

Are counsel

and the parties willing to do all of this for $800?
MR. WILDE:

He don't see that $800 is the Issue,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

What is the issue?

MR. WILDE:

The issue is $23,000 plus Interest at

10 percent since 1985.
THE COURT: You have agreed, have you not, to
dismiss the case in receipt of $8,000?

7

1 I

MR. WILDE:

He agreed to dismiss the case in receipt

2

of $8,000 if it was paid within ten days.

3

reason

4

That's the

—
THE COURT:

Just a moment.

Your agreement at one

5

time, knowing everything that apparently you thought was

6

necessary to know about the case, you agreed to dismiss it for

7

$8,000; is that correct?

8
9
10
11

MR. WILDE:

At that time.

That's the reason we

provided the Court the copy of the order from bankruptcy
court.
THE COURT:

As recent as August 1 of 1989, you were

12

still willing, in light of all of the information you had

13

about the case, to dismiss It for $8,000; Is that correct?

14

MR. WILDE:

If it was received within ten days.

15

THE COURT:

Apparently, all the Court can do is just

16

read the correspondence, and assume that there was a

17

reasonable difference of opinion on what should come first,

18

the money or the dismissal.

19

exchanged simultaneously.

20

party agrees to dismiss, there is a dismissal order filed, the

21

money is paid, dismissal order is recorded, and it is over.

22

The Court notes that in September, less than 30 days after you

23

wrote your letter, the money was deposited In a form of a

24

cashier's check, and the only reason that the money was not

25

tendered is because the party was waiting for an order of

Traditionally, those matters are
If a settlement occurs, the moving

dismissal.
Now, if that'8 all this lawsuit is about, why don't
you sit down and resolve it?
MR. WILDE: May I respond?
THE COURT: The Court would be very interested in
your response.
MR. WILDE: First of all, the reason that we have
provided the Court with the order from the bankruptcy court is
because that order Indicates that the information we had was
not the correct information.
THE COURT: Counsel, whose responsibility is that?
MR. WILDE: If they are going to mislead us. It Is
their responsibility.
THE COURT: Isn't your responsibility to exercise
due diligence when you negotiate In behalf of a client, and
say, You tell us we are only going to get $8,000 out of this
case.

The truth of the matter is we might get $80,000. Whose

responsibility is that?

In the negotiation process doesn't

that occur every day in this city and in every city in the
United States?
A.

I think that misses the point.

The point is

Mr. Jordan had stated under oath, in the bankruptcy court in
Arizona, what his assets were.

The bankruptcy court In

Arizona finds in Its order that the schedules reflect
substantial additional assets.

9

THE COURT:

What date is that order?

MR. WILDE:

September 1 of 1989.

THE COURT:

Are you saying that you now would not

have sent your letter of August 1, had you known that
information?
MR. WILDE:

That's exactly what I am saying.

THE COURT:

What was available to you, through the

bankruptcy court, prior to August 1, in terms of verifying or
disaffirming representations of opposing counsel and his
client?
MR. WILDE:

What was available to us was available

through Mr. Hendrlcksen.

The correspondence in this file

indicates numerous amounts of information.

I believe there

is, under cover of an affidavit from Mr. Newdelman, a copy of
a letter back to me, where he acknowledges that the
representation that Mr. Lochhead had from Mr. Hendrlcksen in
Arizona was less than effective, and that Mr. Hendrlcksen was
not doing anything to further his interest.

I believe the

point, however, Is completely resolved by the case of Watson
vs. Hatch, because in order to reach the point that I see the
Court going at this point in time
THE COURT:

—

The Court is not going in any direction,

The Court is asking some very relevant questions, to clarify
in the Court's mind the history of the case.
MR. WILDE:

Fine.

Letfs talk about the history of

10

the case as
- It relates to the August-September time frame.
THE COURT: That18 a good starting point.
MR. WILDE: We have a letter to them, which says we
will take $8,000 If the check can be received within ten days.
THE COURT: What was the date of the cashier's
check?
MR. WILDE:

I don't know. The point Is, it was not

received 1by us nor was It tendered to us.
THE COURT: The Court isn't sure that isn't the
point.

Was there a cashier'8 check drawn, and did the date on

the cashier's check comply with your ten-day demand?
MR. WILDE: They say that it does.
THE COURT: Have you checked it out?
MR. WILDE:

It was not tendered to us until

September •
THE COURT: Have you looked at the date on the
check?
MR. WILDE: I have looked at the date on the check.
Certainly , It was drawn within that time period.
THE COURT: Then it appears to the Court that the
only dispute iexisting between the parties is, should the check
have been given before the order of dismissal was filed?

Is

the Court incorrect in its analysis?
MR. WILDE: I believe the Court Is incorrect In its
analysis.

11

1
2
3

THE COURT:

Then the Court would like to have you

point out where the Court's reasoning is Incorrect.
MR. WILDE:

The reason the reasoning is incorrect is

4

because if we use the Court's analysis that we need to provide

5

them the dismissal before we get the check, we provided them a

6

dismissal on the 7th of August, through Mr. Green, their

7

counsel, the person who represents them in this court, where

8

the case must be dismissed.

9

upon the fact Mr. Newdelman's affidavits and correspondence

10

So it is fair to assume, based

have been Introduced in this case, through Mr. Green, and

11 I Mr. Green and Mr. Newdelman have some sort of communication
12 I relating to their common client
13
14
15 I

THE COURT:

—

Based on the history of this case, the

Court is not sure that's a fair assumption.
MR. NILDE:

I don't think I want, necessarily, to

16

get into the quality of representation or the missed messages

17

on either end of this arrangement.

18

on the 7th of August, we provided to Mr. Green, in Salt Lake

19

City, for his client, the stipulation and the order.

20

stipulation and the order were entered here.

21
22

THE COURT:

And filed.

However, it is a fact that

The

And the case was dismissed.

What did you do from that day forward?

23 I

MR. WILDE:

We waited for the money.

24

THE COURT:

Did you contact counsel and ask where

26

the check was?

12

1

MR. WILDE:

2 J

THE COURT: Why not?

3 I

MR. WILDE:

4

Ho.

Frankly, I had a number of other matters

In the office, and then I did contact counsel,

I contacted

5 1 Mr. Hewdelman, who I understood to be the man who had the
6

check.

7

as Exhibit 9, my letter to him of September 6, which says, You

8

were supposed to get us a check within ten days.

9

have the check.

10
11
12

I contacted him, and that Is the letter which serves

The case has been dismissed.

We don't

It was done

within the time frame.
THE COURT:

Did you pick up the telephone and call

Salt Lake counsel and say, Where Is that $8,000?

13 I

MR. WILDE:

No.

14

THE COURT:

Why not?

15

MR. WILDE:

My understanding that the check, If It

16

were to come, was going to be coming from Arizona.

17

affidavits, all of the correspondence filed In this action,

18

Indicated that Is correct and that la the case.

19

case turns on Watson vs. Hatch, which says that the Court may

20

not read Into a contract between parties a reasonable time for

21

performance where there Is a specific time for performance set

22

In the contract.

23

All of the

I think the

That's exactly what happened here.

THE COURT:

The Court agrees with you. Counsel,

24

except It appears to the Court that performance was In fact

25

compiled with when the certified check was drawn within the

13

1

ten days that you demanded.

2

have obtained the check, and another $1,000 or $1,500 In legal

3

fees and court costs and all of the problems that have

4

subsequently arisen would have been eliminated.

5

And a simple phone call would

The Court Is miffed, frankly, that legal disputes

6

digress to this level of whatever you want to call It.

7

parties had agreed to a disposition, and at least the

8

compliance was threshold compliance, you want your money, the

9

check Is drawn, they say the check was not tendered because

10

they didn't have the notice of dismissal, It appears to the

11

Court that reasonable people would have picked up the phone

12

and said, Look, we filed the dismissal. Where Is our money?

13

And the person on the other side would say, I drew that check

14

within the ten-day period of time.

15

All I want la a copy of the dismissal.

16

said, Fax It to me, or send It overnight, certified mall,

17

return receipt requested, and the matter would have been

18

resolved.

19
20

If the

It Is a certified check.
And counsel would have

Maybe the Court Is just a little bit too practical
In its approach.

21 I it.

That's just exactly the way the Court sees

Now we are back in court, it has been — we are going on

22

five months, and, basically, what we are talking about Is $800

23

in disputed Interest. That $800 has been consumed two or

24

three times. Where Is the certified check today?

25

MR. GREEN:

It is in Arizona, your Honor.

Counsel

14

1

retains It down there, Mr. Newdelman, but It could be

2

transferred overnight mall very easily.

3

THE COURT:

Goodness sakes, I just don't know, you

4

know, If you were arguing about the fact that there had been a

5

major noncompliance with this agreement, the Court can

6

understand you going back to square one and starting over.

7

But, as the Court reads the correspondence between counsel,

8

there Is a letter dated August 1 that says the plaintiffs have

9

reconsidered and are willing to accept the amount of $8,000

10

for settlement of the above matter, If the amount Is received

11

within the next ten days.

12 J solely to the Lochheads.

The check should be made payable
According to your own

13

representation, a certified check was drawn within the ten-day

14

period, that amount of money, and the response back Is, We

15

want a copy of the dismissal.

16

dismissal, you can get your check.

When we receive the copy of the
I don't know why a couple

17 I of phone calls werenft made and that whole business taken care
18

of.

19 I

MR. WILDE:

May I respond?

20

THE COURT:

Please.

21

MR. WILDE:

Thank you.

First of all, the letter of

22

August 1 does not say provide us evidence that you have an

23

$8,000 check.

24

meaning received by us.

25

accomplish those things which were required.

It says If the check Is received, received
We did what was necessary in order to
We provided the

15

1

stipulation and the dismissal to Salt Lake counsel, who were

2

the only people who could have anything to do with it, since

3

Mr. Newdelman, to my understanding, is not licensed to

4

practice in the State of Utah.

6
6
7 I
8
9
10
11 I
12
13

THE COURT: When you did that, did you ask Salt Lake
counsel for the $8,000 check?
MR. WILDE: No. We understood the check was to be
coming from Arizona.
THE COURT: When it didn't come, did you ask Salt
Lake counsel to follow up and get you your $8,000 check?
MR. WILDE: Mo. We understood it was to be coming
from Arizona.
Secondly, if the Court will examine the history of

14

the relationship in these —

15

indicated to the Court yesterday in the telephone conference,

16

this has been a long history of what we consider to be

17

dilatory tactics by Mr. Jordan, and his Arizona counsel and

18

his prior counsel.

19

between these parties, as I

THE COURT: It may well be true, exactly what you

20

say, everything may be true. At some point in time you were

21

willing to overlook that. As recent as August 1 you said, We

22

have reconsidered, and we are now willing to take it.

23

Irrespective of what may have run under the bridge prior to

24

August l, you were willing to overlook it for $8,000.

25 I

MR. WILDE: For $8,000 and no more dilatory tactics,

16

for prompt payment.

Additionally, we see this as a matter

that is accord and satisfaction.

He have said we are willing

to resolve all of these past problems for the payment of
$8,000 timely made.

My understanding of the law of accord and

satisfaction is if the accord is not satisfied, then the
claiming party may either sue on the accord and satisfaction
or may Ignore the accord and satisfaction and go back to the
original obligation, which is exactly what we have chosen to
do.
THE C00RT:

Technically, you may be correct.

Court views it in Just a little bit different light.

The
The

Court believes that in all of the bump and grind of the
profession, there ought to be, someplace conspicuously visible
to everyone, some good judgment and common sense.

The Court

believes that that ought to be common with everyone.

What has

happened to what we call good judgment and common sense?
If the dismissal were tendered, as you say it was,
one phone call would have indicated that the check was not in
Salt Lake.
call.

Counsel in Salt Lake would have made a telephone

The check would have been sent.

The matter would have

been resolved.

If after demand it was not sent, then you have

nonperformance.

But to have two counsel, who are representing

the same client, not let the left hand know what the right
hand Is doing, and then use that as some basis to unwind an
agreement that was perfectly acceptable to you before, doesn't

17

1

make a lot of sense to the Court.

2 1

MR. WILDE: Your Honor, again, the other point here

3

is that the acceptable agreement was made before we were aware

4

that the representations we had received from Mr. Jordan,

5

based on the findings of the bankruptcy court, were apparently

6

inadequate or in error or misrepresented or whatever.

7

THE COURT: Counsel, the Court understands that.

8

The Court understands precisely what you are saying. Whose

9

responsibility is it to check out that kind of information?

10

You certainly believed that opposing counsel is going to

11

advance his client's cause in his client*8 best interest. He

12

is going to tell you, whether it Is factual or actual, that he

13

believes if you go through a proceeding you are not going to

14

get $8,000 out of the bankruptcy court, anyway.

15

opinion.

16

ought to check it out.

17 I

Thatfs his

If you have a differing opinion on that, then you

MR. WILDE: We perceived this rather to be a matter

18

of factual misrepresentation by Mr. Jordan. Anyway, suffice

19

it to say, I believe we have presented the Court with our

20

arguments, and we will submit the matter.

21

THE COURT: Anything further?

22

MR. GREEN: Just very briefly, your Honor. Three

23

main points. Mr. Wilde says he is not aware of the

24

requirement of Mr. Newdelman, the Phoenix lawyer —

25

THE COURT: Let the Court bring you right to the

18

point on your argument. What does fairness In this situation
dictate. In terms of Interest from the date the check was
drawn and not delivered, or In terms of compensating, If you
will, for expenses that may have been incurred In trying to
get the check?

As long as the Court Is focused this morning

on what Is a reasonable approach to the resolution of the
problem, why don't you tell the Court what you think would be
fair and appropriate In terms of compensating the defendant
for $8,000 that he agreed to receive and hasn't received since
August.
MR. GREEN:

I believe what would be fair is for him

to receive that $8,000 as quickly as possible.
THE COURT: What else?
MR. GREEN:

I believe it would be reasonable and I

dare say for the defendant to be reimbursed for his costs
incurred in defending this motion to vacate. That's where I
need to get into some of the reasons for that.
THE COURT: What about the plaintiff being given the
legal rate of Interest on his money?

If the check had been In

the bank he would have been earning interest on the $8,000
since the 10th of August, would he not?

It is now the middle

of November.
MR. GREEN: Two points. The defendant didn't earn
Interest on that money.

That's in that cashier's check.

Point number two, we tendered those funds pursuant to the

19

1

tender statute late In September.

Number three. It has been

2

available for the plaintiff all along, and we ought not to be

3

punished because of what they have done, delaying that

4

delivery of the funds.

5

enough, I assure you, with the expense and inconvenience of

6

this litigation.

The defendant has been punished quite

7

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

8

MR. GREEN:

Regarding the requirement of the

9
10

defendant's counsel in Phoenix that he receive an order of
dismissal, I have just reviewed the file, probably as briefly

11 I as the Court has, but May 24 of 1989, Mr. Newdelman says, We
12

will pay the $8,000.

13

would be a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a

14

mutual release.

15

1989, "You will need to obtain for me either a satisfaction of

16

judgment or a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice.

17

turn, I will prepare a mutual release.M

18
19

The only requirement which I impose

Prior to that, he says, this Is February 6 of

THE COURT:

In

The Court assumes that all of that stuff

was resolved between the parties as of August 1, 1989.

20

MR. GREEN:

I believe that's correct.

21

THE COURT:

Let's go from August 1.

22

MR. GREEN:

From August 1, it is significant that

23

the stipulation and the order say nothing about ten days.

24

That's what I signed.

25

the contract?

They rely upon contract law.

Where is

It is a letter from Mr. Wilde, saying, We want

20

1

it in ten days; in response to which there is a letter from

2

Newdelman saying, You will get it when we get the dismissal.

3

I signed the stipulation.

4

haven't represented him effectively since the bankruptcy was

5

filed two years ago.

6

THE COURT:

That!s all I do at this point.

The Court is aware of that.

The Court

7

understands that there has been some confusion.

8

Is of the opinion that the confusion can be distributed

9

equally to all counsel and parties.

10

MR. GREEN:

I

And the Court

That's one reason I am telling you that.

11

I didn't know anything about ten days at any time.

12

copied on the letter to Mr. Newdelman.

I was not

13

THE COURT:

Did you receive a copy of the dismissal?

14

MR. GREEN:

No.

15

That's all I got.

16

dismissal.

17
18

I signed the stipulation.

I signed approving as to form on the

THE COURT:
dismissal

No.

At least you knew there was a

—

19

MR. GREEN:

Absolutely.

20

THE COURT:

What did you do about giving up the

21
22

$8,000 after you

—

MR. GREEN:

I didn't have $8,000.

I didnft know

23

what the terras were they had arranged to make payment.

A

24

phone call, granted, from Mr. Wilde or Mr. Newdelman would

25

have solved that problem.

If I may approach the bench with

21

tender statute late in September.

Number three, it has been

available for the plaintiff all along, and we ought not: to be
punished because of what they have done, delaying that
delivery of the funds.

The defendant has been punished quite

enough, I assure you, with the expense and inconvenience of
this litigation.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. GREEN:

Regarding the requirement of the

defendants counsel in Phoenix that he receive an order of
dismissal, I have just reviewed the file, probably as briefly
as the Court has, but May 24 of 1989, Mr. Newdelman says, We
will pay the $8,000.

The only requirement which I impose

would be a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a
mutual release.

Prior to that, he says, this is February 6 of

1989, "You will need to obtain for me either a satisfaction of
judgment or a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice.

In

turn, I will prepare a mutual release."
THE COURT:

The Court assumes that all of that stuff

was resolved between the parties as of August 1, 1989.
MR. GREEN:

I believe that's correct.

THE COURT:

Let's go from August 1.

MR. GREEN:

From August 1, it is significant that

the stipulation and the order say nothing about ten days.
That's what I signed.
the contract?

They rely upon contract law.

Where is

It is a letter from Mr. Wilde, saying, We want

20

1

we offered them the money, and September 7 Mr, Newdelman sent

2

him a letter, in response to the September 6 letter from

3

Mr. Wilde, saying the money is here.

4

have the dismissal.

5

before, the withdrawal of the settlement.

6

would be fair would be to put one month's interest on there.

7

There was no confusion as of September 7.

8

we stood.

9

September 6 or 7, at least this matter could have been

We will send it, if we

By that time he had received, just a day
I suppose what

We knew right where

Interest ought not to be tacked on.

Since

10

resolved, defendants were willing to resolve it, and we are

11

here on the plaintiff's motion, and I think the Court has

12

correctly analyzed that.

13

business about the misrepresentation.

14
15
16
17

THE COURT:

The other point I would make is the

Is that really necessary to argue, based

on what the Court has indicated its assessment of the case?
MR. GREEN:

I don't believe so, and I don't believe

it is before the Court.

I would submit it on that basis,

18

THE COURT:

Both parties submit?

19

MR. WILDE:

We will submit it, your Honor,

20

THE COURT:

What is the motion before the Court?

21

MR. WILDE:

The motion before the Court is to vacate

22

the dismissal which was previously entered.

23

THE COURT:

Any other motions?

24

MR. GREEN:

None, your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Both counsel submit on all motions

23

some additional authority, which I think you will find
supports the Court's point of view.
Contrary to what Counsel says about accord and
satisfaction, the Court has ruled twice now.
policy.

It is the same

These cases involve the enforcement of a settlement

agreement.

It is the same policy that governs here, where one

party seeks to avoid a settlement agreement, and vacate an
order.

The Court has ruled.

And I am referring to the Tracy

case, the parties trying to avoid the settlement claimed that
counsel for the other party had not timely filed some
documents that were necessary for the settlement.
The Court rules at the very end, the summary
procedure is admirably suited to situations where, for
example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown,
which we have here, and the excuse for nonperformance,is
comparatively unsubstantial.

On the other hand, it is ill-

suited to situations presenting complex factual situations.
If anything, Tracy is much more complex than the case we have
here.

The case we have here says, what came first?

Should we

deliver the $8,000 or get the dismissal?
THE COURT:

The Court is comfortable with its

assessment of the law, at this posture of the argument.
MR. GREEN:
two points.

The only thing I would add, your Honor,

In terms of fairness, it is my honest opinion

that the defendant has been penalized enough, especially where

22
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1

before the Court?

2

MR. GREEN:

Correct, your Honor.

3

MR. WILDE:

We do,

4

THE COURT:

The motion to vacate is denied.

The

5

Court orders, as part of that denial, that counsel for the

6

defendant obtain $8,000 in certified funds on or before

7

5:00 p.m., November 20, that that money, in certified funds,

8

be hand carried to counsel for the plaintiff.

9

further orders that interest be calculated from August 10 to

The Court

10

November 20 at the legal rate, and that a certified check,

11

including interest at the legal rate for that period of time,

12

also be tendered to counsel for the plaintiff on or before

13

November 20, 1989, 5:00 p.m.

14

for the defendant prepare an appropriate order, consistent

15

with the ruling of the Court.

16

to the Court on or before November 22, 1989, at 12 noon, for

17

signing and filing with the clerk.

The Court orders that counsel

That order is to be submitted

Is there anything further?

18

MR. WILDE:

We don't have anything, your Honor.

19

MR. GREEN:

Nothing, your Honor.

20 J

(Court was in recess.)

Thank you.

21
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23
24
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